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THE CASE AGAINST CHEVRON DEFERENCE IN
IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER†
ABSTRACT
The Duke Law Journal’s fifty-first annual administrative law
symposium examines the future of Chevron deference—the command that
a reviewing court defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute the agency administers. In the lead article, Professors
Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson argue that the Supreme Court should
narrow Chevron’s domain to exclude interpretations made via
administrative adjudication. Building on their framing, this Article
presents an in-depth case study of immigration adjudication and argues
that this case against Chevron has perhaps its greatest force when it comes
to immigration. That is because much of Chevron’s theory for
congressional delegation and judicial deference—including agency
expertise, deliberative process, and even political accountability—
collapses in the immigration adjudication context.
As for potential reform, Professors Hickman and Nielson
understandably focus on the Supreme Court. This Article also explores that
judicial option but argues that it is a mistake to focus just on courts when
it comes to immigration law and policy. The political branches can and
should act to narrow Chevron’s domain. First, this proposal should be part
of any comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Second, the
Executive Branch can and should embrace this reform internally—by not
seeking Chevron deference in immigration adjudication and by turning to
rulemaking instead of adjudication to make major immigration policy.
Shifting the immigration policymaking default from adjudication to
rulemaking is more consistent with Chevron’s theoretical foundations—to
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leverage agency expertise, to engage in a deliberative process, and to
increase political accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, we have seen a growing call, largely from those
right of center, to eliminate Chevron1 deference—the command that federal
courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers so long
as the statutory provision is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.2 Those calls arrived center stage during the March 2017 Senate
1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842–43. For a collection of these criticisms, see generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking
Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018). Notably,
scholarly criticisms of Chevron predate the current wave and have been lodged by scholars across the
ideological spectrum. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782–84 (2010)
(outlining ten reasons why Chevron should be overruled); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (“The danger of
Chevron’s song lies in its apparent obliviousness to the fundamental alterations it makes in our
constitutional conception of the administrative state.”).
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Judiciary Committee hearing on then-Judge Neil Gorsuch’s nomination to
the Supreme Court. While serving on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch had penned
a concurring opinion that questioned the constitutionality and wisdom of
Chevron deference and suggested that “[m]aybe the time has come to face
the [Chevron] behemoth.”3
Chevron deference garnered nearly one hundred mentions at Gorsuch’s
confirmation hearing.4 The senators’ opening statements are illustrative.
Senator Dianne Feinstein proclaimed that Gorsuch’s apparent call to
eliminate Chevron deference was an attack on science and “would
dramatically affect how laws passed by Congress can be properly carried
out” by federal agencies.5 Senator Amy Klobuchar asserted that Chevron’s
demise “would have titanic real-world implications on all aspects of our
everyday lives. Countless rules could be in jeopardy, protections that matter
to the American people would be compromised, and there would be
widespread uncertainty.”6 “[T]o those who subscribe to President Trump’s
extreme view,” Senator Al Franken declared, “Chevron is the only thing
standing between them and what the President’s chief strategist Steve
Bannon called the ‘deconstruction of the administrative state,’ which is
shorthand for gutting any environmental or consumer protection measure
that gets in the way of corporate profit margins.”7 In total, eight senators
mentioned Gorsuch’s views on Chevron deference during their questioning.8
Simply put, the potential demise of Chevron deference was a core talking
point against Gorsuch’s elevation to the Supreme Court.
Justice Gorsuch has since finished his third full year on the Supreme
Court. Yet the Chevron revolution the senators feared has not materialized.
To the contrary, in Kisor v. Wilkie,9 the Court rejected a challenge to
eliminate Auer10 deference—a sibling doctrine regarding judicial deference
3. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
4. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. passim (2017) [hereinafter Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing] (mentioning the word “Chevron”
ninety-four times).
5. Id. at 6–7 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
6. Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
7. Id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Al Franken, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
8. See id. at 86–87 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. at 90–91, 271–73 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary ); id. at 127–29 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 153–55, 302–03 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); id. at 159 (statement of
Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 174–76 (statement of Sen. Franken);
id. at 201–02, 331–32 (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 216–17
(statement of Sen. Mike Crapo, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
9. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
10. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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to agency regulatory interpretations.11 Despite Chief Justice John Roberts’s
suggestion that Kisor’s reaffirmance of Auer did not “touch upon
the . . . question” of Chevron deference,12 we do not expect the Court to
overturn Chevron any time soon. In our view, Auer was more susceptible to
a legal challenge than Chevron. Yet the Court did not overturn Auer when it
had the chance. Chevron should be similarly safe. Nor do we expect
Congress to eliminate Chevron deference—despite various legislative
proposals to do so in recent years.13
Although a wholesale reconsideration of Chevron deference is unlikely
in the near future, this Article returns to the context that caused Gorsuch to
express concerns about Chevron in the first place: immigration adjudication.
In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,14 the Tenth Circuit confronted and rejected
an agency statutory interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had embraced via
agency adjudication.15 Gorsuch authored the opinion for the Tenth Circuit16
and published a separate concurrence to observe that “[t]here’s an elephant
in the room”: Chevron deference.17
That elephant remains in the immigration courtroom. This Article seeks
to return the debate about Chevron deference to this immigration context. To
do so, it builds on the lead article in this Symposium, in which Professors
Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson argue that the Supreme Court should
narrow Chevron’s domain to exclude, or at a minimum reduce, judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretations established in an administrative
adjudication.18 Further, this Article draws from important scholarship on
immigration adjudication to reassess the empirical and theoretical
underpinnings of Chevron’s domain in immigration adjudication.
11. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422–23. To be sure, Justice Gorsuch disagreed with the 5–4 majority and
penned the principal concurring opinion, in which he argued that Auer should be replaced with the less
deferential Skidmore standard. Id. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (preferring the standard set out in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
12. Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (casting the deciding vote to uphold Auer
deference under stare decisis).
13. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2 (amending
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to eliminate Auer and Chevron deference); Separation of
Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. tit. II, § 202 (2017) (same); see also Christopher J. Walker,
Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 667–69 (2017) (discussing
legislative efforts to eliminate or narrow Auer and Chevron deference).
14. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
15. Id. at 1144–46.
16. Id. at 1143.
17. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
18. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 938
(2021).
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Ultimately, the case against Chevron deference in administrative
adjudication has perhaps its greatest force when it comes to immigration
adjudication.19
On closer examination, the theoretical foundations for Chevron
deference crumble in this context. Chevron’s core rationale for congressional
delegation and judicial deference—agency expertise—is particularly weak
in immigration adjudication. Unlike in other regulatory contexts, the
statutory ambiguities immigration adjudicators address seldom implicate
scientific or other technical expertise. The second leading and related
rationale—deliberative process—is even weaker here than in other
adjudicative contexts. After all, immigration adjudication is on the fringe of
the “new world of agency adjudication.”20 It is not formal adjudication under
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and therefore lacks many of the
signature procedural protections afforded in APA-governed formal
adjudication.21 The third central rationale—political accountability—may at
first blush seem compelling in immigration adjudication, due to the attorney
general’s final decisionmaking authority.22 Building on Professors Hickman
and Nielson’s framing, however, we argue that agency-head review is
necessary yet insufficient for Chevron’s accountability theory. The theory
should encompass a robust public engagement component, with public
notice and an opportunity to be heard for those—beyond the parties in the
adjudication itself—who would be affected by the agency’s statutory
interpretation. Agency adjudication seldom provides that, and perhaps even
less so in immigration adjudication.
19. Throughout this Article and unless otherwise noted, we use “agency adjudication” or
“administrative adjudication” as shorthand for any agency adjudication where a hearing is required by
statute or regulation. In other words, we are grouping together what in the literature are referred to as
Type A (APA-governed formal agency adjudication) and Type B (formal-like agency adjudication where
a hearing is required by another statute or regulation) adjudications, and we are expressly not discussing
or comparing less formal Type C adjudications where no hearing is required. See Christopher J. Walker
& Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 153–57
(2019) (discussing the Type A, B, and C categorizations of agency adjudication embraced by the
Administrative Conference of the United States in Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312,
94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016)).
20. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 154; id. at 143 (“The vast majority of agency
adjudications today, however, do not look like APA formal adjudication. Instead, agencies regulate using
adjudicatory means that still require evidentiary hearings but do not embrace all of the features set forth
in the APA.”).
21. See id. at 172. For the APA’s formal procedural requirements, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557 (2018),
and Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 148–53, 150 tbl.1. For more on how immigration
adjudication differs from APA-governed formal adjudication, see MICHAEL ASIMOW, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 151–58 (2019).
22. But see Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 173 (“[T]he Attorney General only reviews
cases on a discretionary basis.”).
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To be sure, this is not an argument for eliminating Chevron deference
entirely in the immigration context. Others have advanced largely
substantive arguments against Chevron when it comes to interpretations that
infringe on liberty, including in the refugee and asylum context.23 Here, the
argument against Chevron, by contrast, is largely procedural, not
substantive. Chevron deference should apply in the immigration context only
to agency statutory interpretations promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking. The lessdeferential Skidmore24 standard should
govern interpretations advanced in immigration adjudication.25 As one of us
(Wadhia) has explored in calling for rulemaking for deferred action in
immigration, there is tremendous value in national uniformity and in publicfacing deliberative process when crafting immigration law and policy—both
of which would be inhibited if courts, as opposed to agencies, take the
leading role.26 In other words, rulemaking should be the predominant
administrative tool for implementing Congress’s immigration laws and for
making immigration policy at the agency level.
There remains the issue of how to effectuate this reform. Professors
Hickman and Nielson understandably focus on the Supreme Court,27 and this
Article also discusses stare decisis and judicial action. But for immigration
law and policy, it is a mistake to focus on just federal courts. The political
branches can and should act to narrow Chevron’s domain. First, the proposal
presented here should be part of any comprehensive immigration reform
legislation. As Professor Kent Barnett details, Congress has codified lesser
deference standards for certain agency actions28—it should do so in
immigration adjudication, too. Second, the Executive Branch can and should
embrace this reform internally by not seeking Chevron deference in
immigration adjudication and by turning to rulemaking instead of
adjudication to make major immigration policy. The Biden administration
23. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 495, 532–33
(2019) (arguing for “a physical liberty exception to Chevron” in the immigration context); Maureen A.
Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127,
135, 189–92 (2019) (discouraging application of Chevron deference to withholding and asylum
decisions).
24. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
25. See id. at 140 (instructing courts to give “weight” to an agency’s statutory interpretation based
“upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control”).
26. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 85–87, 152–55 (2015) [hereinafter WADHIA, BEYOND
DEPORTATION].
27. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 938.
28. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2015).
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should embrace this reform, and senators of both parties should extract this
commitment from the next attorney general nominee as part of the
confirmation process.
In other words, both political branches should work to shift the default
from adjudication to rulemaking for immigration policymaking at the agency
level. Legislatively eliminating Chevron deference for immigration
adjudication should encourage more notice-and-comment rulemaking. But
to successfully flip the default to rulemaking, the Executive Branch likely
must also commit to the reform internally. As detailed in this Article, this
shift from adjudication to rulemaking would be more consistent with the
theoretical foundations of the Chevron doctrine—to better leverage agency
expertise, to engage in a more deliberative process, and to increase political
accountability.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
immigration adjudication, including how the Supreme Court has applied
Chevron deference in the immigration context. Part II critically examines
Chevron’s theoretical foundations as applied to the immigration adjudication
context. Part III explores the mechanics of narrowing Chevron’s domain to
exclude agency statutory interpretations advanced via immigration
adjudication—suggesting potential reforms by all three branches of the
federal government.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
Immigration decisions are made every day by a universe of people and
agencies. An officer employed by the Department of State and situated in a
U.S. consulate or embassy abroad may decide if a foreign national is eligible
for immigration status and entitled to a visa.29 A line officer from
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) may issue a supervision
order to an immigrant during a routine check-in.30 An adjudicator in U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) may interview a couple
and grant adjustment of status (a “green card”) to the immigrant

29. Consular Affairs by the Numbers, U.S. DEP’T STATE (2020), https://travel.state.gov/content/
dam/travel/CA-By-the-Number-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EW-LFYU]; see also U.S. Visas, U.S.
DEP’T STATE, BUREAU CONSULAR AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas.html [https://
perma.cc/U47F-PSNR].
30. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF
TRUMP 48 (2019) [hereinafter WADHIA, BANNED]; Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T (last updated Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/detention-management [https://perma.cc/L9KZVV92].
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beneficiary.31 An inspector at Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) may
deport a father who arrives at a land border without papers.32 ICE, CBP, and
USCIS are units in the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and their
employees are responsible for making a range of immigration enforcement
and benefits decisions with significant impacts on immigrants and their
families.33
In fact, the majority of removal (deportation) orders issued each year
are made by DHS officers through what one of us (Wadhia) has coined a
“speedy deportation.”34 Speedy deportation refers to three programs under
the INA that authorize DHS to remove noncitizens without a hearing or
review before an immigration judge. These programs are formally called
administrative removal, expedited removal, and reinstatement of removal.35
Last year, the Supreme Court upheld the statutory bars to habeas review of
one of these programs, expedited removal, against a Suspension Clause
constitutional challenge—with Justice Sonia Sotomayor declaring in dissent
that the “decision handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its
constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical
component of the separation of powers.”36
Immigration adjudications are also made by employees of the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). DOJ houses the immigration court system
known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).37
Immigration judges at EOIR preside over removal hearings at which a
31. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://
www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/adjustment-of-status
[https://
perma.cc/XJP6-WBEB]; Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/greencard [https://perma.cc/S6LG-RQ8L].
32. See Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/
border-security/along-us-borders [https://perma.cc/L33U-3TVU] (describing detection of undocumented
immigrants as a duty of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Patrol).
33. See Operational and Support Components, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (last updated Dec. 3,
2020), https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://perma.cc/YC87-6TBJ].
34. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 80; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed
Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 passim (2014). For another scholar’s
discussion of expedited deportations, see Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching
for Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U.
L. REV. 337, 341 (2018), and Jennifer Lee Koh & Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Opinion, Deport, Not
Court? The U.S. Is Already Doing That, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhia-deportations-20180630-story.html [https://perma.cc/
UK7K-Q4K4].
35. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 79.
36. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1993 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
37. About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/TNZ3-WTG7].
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noncitizen—known as the respondent—is charged with a violation of
immigration law and a number of other hearings, such as bond hearings and
reviews of fear determinations made by DHS.38 As Part I.A details, the
attorney general and the BIA exercise agency appellate review over
immigration judge decisions.
This Article focuses on one strand of immigration adjudication:
removal proceedings before DOJ’s immigration courts, the BIA, and the
attorney general. Part I.A provides an overview of that system, and Part I.B
explains how federal courts have applied Chevron deference to statutory
interpretations embraced via immigration adjudication.
A. Immigration Adjudication Process
Most immigration cases at EOIR involve people in removal
proceedings,39 which are triggered when a charging document called the
Notice to Appear (“NTA”) is filed with the immigration court.40 A number
of DHS employees—attorneys and nonattorneys alike—can issue an NTA.41
The NTA contains information that includes notice about the location and
time of a court proceeding and the reasons a person is alleged to be in
violation of immigration law.42
In removal proceedings, trial attorneys from ICE represent the
government and act as “prosecutors.”43 Respondent noncitizens represent
themselves pro se or are represented by an attorney or accredited
representative.44 Removal hearings are adversarial, but the proceedings

38. PLANNING, ANALYSIS & STAT. DIV. OF THE EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 4–6, 15 tbl.6 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 STATISTICS
YEARBOOK], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/6UN5-4WJ2].
39. In fiscal year 2018, 182,010 of the 195,213 cases (93.2 percent) completed by the EOIR
involved removal proceedings. Id. at 12 tbl.5.
40. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13–1003.15 (2020); see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL & CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L., NOTICES TO APPEAR: LEGAL
CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES 2 (2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/76BC-Y3KM].
41. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (listing the types of immigration officers with authority to issue a
Notice to Appear); CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L. &
COMM’N ON IMMIGR. OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE A NOTICE TO APPEAR:
IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 13–18 (2013), https://
pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/NTAReportFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
96FH-ZWMZ].
42. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2018) (listing
information required in a Notice to Appear); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15.
43. See Attorney, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (last updated Aug. 5, 2020), https://
www.ice.gov/careers/attorney [https://perma.cc/5HYT-FF84].
44. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5.
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themselves are “civil,” not “criminal.”45 Unlike the criminal justice system,
in removal proceedings there is no right to a grand jury, speedy trial, courtappointed counsel, or mandated timeframe during which an immigrant must
see a judge.46
The immigration court has two dockets: one for respondents outside of
detention and a second for those detained.47 The adjudicative process begins
with the “master calendar hearing,” when an immigration judge may ask the
respondent if she needs more time to find counsel or to respond to the charges
of the NTA.48 If the respondent concedes to removability or the immigration
judge finds the same, the next stage of removal proceedings often involves
the respondent applying for relief from removal. Respondents seek such
relief at a stage in the removal process known as the “individual merits
hearing,” or the “merits hearing.” These are evidentiary hearings at which
both the government and the respondent may present evidence and witness
testimony, including testimony of the respondent herself.49 The various
forms of relief act as “defenses” to removal and include asylum, cancellation
of removal, and waivers from inadmissibility.50 In removal proceedings, the
45. This technical distinction is the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The
New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (noting the displacement of “the civil regulatory model of immigration law” with
a “criminal justice model”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 289, 289 (2008) (“[R]emoval and traditional criminal proceedings . . . can be indistinguishable but
for the relative lack of procedural protections and the often graver liberty interest at stake in the former.”);
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1822, 1824–26 (2011) (critiquing the civil–
criminal line in the preemption context); see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE:
HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM FALLS SHORT OF AMERICAN IDEALS OF JUSTICE 1–2 (2013), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aic_twotwosystemsofjust.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6WS-RVQD] (“Although immigration law is formally termed ‘civil,’ Congress has
progressively expanded the number of crimes that may render an individual deportable, and immigration
law violations often lead to criminal prosecutions.”).
46. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 7–10; WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note
26, at 52; Legomsky, supra note 45, at 511–18.
47. Detention Management, supra note 30.
48. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., REPRESENTING CLIENTS AT THE MASTER CALENDAR HEARING
1 (2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rep_clnts_mstr_cal_hearing-20181220.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36TK-P3SM]; Immigration Judge Master Calendar Checklist for Pro Se Respondents,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/924091/
download [https://perma.cc/E7EF-LTC6].
49. See INA § 240(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2018) (prescribing the form of these proceedings); see also
OFF. OF THE CHIEF IMMIGR. JUDGE OF THE EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 80 (2020) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL], https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download [https://perma.cc/9Y9F-6APZ].
50. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in
Immigration Cases, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 377 (2020).
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respondent bears the burden of proving eligibility for relief.51 For example,
an asylum seeker must prove to an immigration judge that she has suffered
persecution or has a fear of future persecution because of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.52
While immigrants in removal proceedings speak multiple languages, all
forms they must fill out are available in English only.53
The INA provides a statutory right to counsel in removal proceedings
at no expense to the government.54 Many immigrants in removal proceedings
are unable to access or pay for a lawyer and so must navigate the process
without one.55 Detained immigrants are dramatically more likely to face
immigration court alone.56 Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not attach in these proceedings, the Fifth Amendment right to due
process applies, such that removal proceedings must be fundamentally fair.57
The INA provides additional rights during removal proceedings, including
the right to present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses
and evidence.58 In removal proceedings, respondents also have the right to
an interpreter.59
Immigration judges play a significant role during removal proceedings.
They ask questions of the parties. They make decisions about whether to

51. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (c)(4)(a).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2020).
53. See, e.g., EOIR-29, Notificación de Apelación Ante la Junta de Apelaciones de Inmigración
Sobre una Decisión de un Oficial de Inmigración, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated June
12, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/es/eoir-29 [https://perma.cc/773P-EEUE] (providing only Englishlanguage forms on the Spanish-language website).
54. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362.
55. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (finding “that only 37% of immigrants had counsel” in immigration
proceedings from 2007 to 2012); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 42, 46 (2010) (noting detainees’ limited access to attorneys (citing Margaret H. Taylor,
Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 1647, 1651–52 (1997))).
56. Who Is Represented in Immigration Court?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/485 [https://perma.cc/9AYU-74HB].
57. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Note, A Second Chance:
The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1544, 1548–49 (2007) (collecting cases on the lack of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in removal
proceedings).
58. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4).
59. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 64; Cristobal Ramón & Lucas Reyes, Language Access
in the Immigration System: A Primer, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://
bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/language-access-in-the-immigration-system-a-primer
[https://perma.cc/
YQG5-GUR9].
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continue, terminate, or close a proceeding.60 They also decide a respondent’s
eligibility for relief from removal, which may be delivered in writing or
orally.61 Once the judge hands down her decision, the respondent or ICE trial
attorney may appeal to the BIA.62 Unlike immigration courts, which are
sprinkled throughout the country, the BIA is housed in one building in Falls
Church, Virginia.63 Importantly, appeals must be made within thirty days of
the immigration judge’s decision.64 Because a formal transcript of the
hearing can be mailed later than thirty days after the decision, the respondent
and counsel, if any, must pay close attention during the oral hearing.
Appeals to the BIA are common. And yet, most decisions are not
appealed by either party.65 For respondents, filing an appeal can be expensive
or could mean that they remain in detention pending appeal. Absent an
appeal, the immigration judge’s decision is “final” and may result in the
immigrant obtaining relief or a formal order of removal.66 If an appeal is
filed, a decision by the BIA to affirm a removal order constitutes the final
order of removal.67 At this point, the BIA may publish its decision as
precedential, which means it is legally binding on other immigration
adjudications.68 More often, BIA decisions are unpublished and thus
nonprecedential69—and issued by a single judge or panel without the same

60. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10(b), 1240.12 (2020).
61. Id.
62. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1–1003.8 (describing the process to appeal to the BIA from
immigration judges’ decisions in removal proceedings).
63. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated
May 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/DWK3SK8N].
64. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15.
65. Compare 2018 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 38, at 7 fig.2 (indicating 195,571 matters
completed in fiscal year 2018), with id. at 35 fig.27 (noting 49,522 appeals received by the BIA the same
year).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (implementing INA § 101(a)(47)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (2018)).
67. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(7), 1241.1.
68. Id. § 103.10(b) (“Selected decisions designated by the Board, decisions of the Attorney General,
and decisions of the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . shall serve as precedents in all proceedings
involving the same issue or issues.”).
69. Of the 29,788 cases completed by the BIA in 2018, only twenty-three resulted in precedential
opinions. Compare 2018 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 38, at 35 fig.27 (indicating the number of
cases completed in 2018), with Volume 27, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated
June 12, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-27 [https://perma.cc/AMT9-32JF] (listing
precedential opinions).
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binding nature.70 When making decisions, BIA members are required by
regulation to exercise “independent judgment and discretion.”71
The regulations allow the attorney general to certify a decision by the
BIA and issue a new decision.72 The reality is that attorney general decisions
are legally binding,73 with little to no regard for the stature of precedent. To
illustrate, in Matter of L-E-A-,74 then-Attorney General William Barr
announced a new position for asylum claims based on family relationships.75
In general, asylum applicants must show they have suffered persecution in
the past or have a well-founded fear of future persecution for one of five
reasons: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group.76 And historically, the federal government and
federal courts have recognized that family can be a particular social group.77
Barr was critical of the BIA’s 2017 decision in Matter of L-E-A- because it
“improperly recognized the respondent’s father’s immediate family as a
‘particular social group.’”78
The case involved a Mexican national and citizen who feared
persecution from a criminal gang because of his relationship to his father.79
His father operated a neighborhood general store targeted by a drug cartel.80
The respondent’s father refused to allow the drug cartel to operate out of his
general store, which the respondent believed to be the reason his father

70. See, e.g., David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1205
(2016) (noting the BIA’s more recent practice of permitting single members to issue single-sentence
affirmances with no reasoning and therefore no precedential value); see also infra note 179 (discussing
number of precedential decisions issued in the Trump administration).
71. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).
72. Id. § 103.10(c).
73. Id. § 103.10(b).
74. In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (Att’y Gen. 2019).
75. Id. at 581.
76. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “every
circuit to have considered the question has held that family ties can provide a basis for asylum” and
collecting BIA opinions which held the same); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and
immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33
(B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that “membership in a particular social group” can be based on “kinship ties”),
abrogated on other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), as recognized in In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (B.I.A. 1985)
(finding a Somalian subclan to be a “particular social group” linked by kinship ties and “identifiable as a
group based upon linguistic commonalities”).
78. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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became a target.81 Barr did not agree that the respondent’s family
relationship qualified as a “social group,” and he held that “most nuclear
families are not inherently socially distinct and therefore do not qualify as
‘particular social groups.’”82 Critics of Matter of L-E-A- argued that Barr’s
decision undermined the body of caselaw that recognized individuals like the
respondent.83 And yet, Barr’s decision is now legally binding and informs
and limits the ability for asylum seekers to seek protection based on a family
relationship.
Attorney general certification rulings pervaded decisionmaking during
the Trump administration. As of this writing, there have been fourteen
attorney general certification rulings.84 Fourteen might appear to be a small
number, but equally important to the number of certifications is the scope of
the decisions and erosion of BIA precedent. Professor Richard Frankel
showcases how certification spiked during the Trump administration and
argues these decisions should not receive Chevron deference.85 Says
Professor Frankel:
[The Attorney General] has imposed new restrictions that deprive victims
of domestic violence and gang threats from seeking asylum, revoked the
authority of immigration judges to put deportation cases on hold or grant
continuances while non-citizens await decisions on applications for relief
from deportation, and ordered increased imprisonment of non-citizens and

81. Id. at 583.
82. Id. at 581.
83. See supra note 77; see also Jeffrey S. Chase, L-E-A-: How Much Did the AG Change?, JEFFREY
S. CHASE BLOG (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/8/11/l-e-a-how-much-didthe-ag-change [https://perma.cc/SW62-AUUX] (criticizing Barr’s attempt to overhaul decades’ worth of
caselaw).
84. Since 2017, the attorney general has issued precedential decisions in fourteen certified cases: In
re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018);
In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462
(Att’y Gen. 2018); In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581; In re
Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664 (Att’y Gen. 2019); In re Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674
(Att’y Gen. 2019); In re R-A-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re O‑F‑A‑S‑, 28 I. & N. Dec.
35 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re Reyes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 52 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re A-C-A-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec.
84 (Att’y Gen. 2020); and In re Negusie, 28 I. & N. 120 (Att’y Gen. 2020).
85. Richard Frankel, Deporting Chevron: Why the Attorney General’s Immigration Decisions
Should Not Receive Chevron Deference 5, 7, 33 (Drexel Univ. Sch. of L., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 2019-W-02), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492115 [https://perma.cc/3RXT-B726].
Professor Frankel is not alone in his concerns. See, e.g., WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 58–59
(discussing increased use of the certification power under the Trump administration); Bijal Shah, The
Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 129, 131 (2017)
(discussing the disruptive nature of the certification power and arguing that its use undermines uniformity
within the law). Part II returns to Professor Frankel’s arguments against Chevron deference to attorney
general decisions.
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reduced immigration judges’ authority to grant bond, among other
rulings.86

Similarly, Professor Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer and attorney Hillary Rich
have argued against Chevron deference in connection with Matter of A-B-.87
There, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a decision involving an
asylum seeker who claimed she was persecuted on account of her
membership in the purported particular social group of “Salvadoran women
who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have
children in common.”88 In adopting Matter of A-B-, Sessions also overruled
Matter of A-R-C-G-,89 a precedential decision from 2014.90 Building on more
than a decade of jurisprudence, Matter of A-R-C-G- was a signature
precedential decision that clearly recognized domestic violence as a basis for
asylum.91 Professor Kelley-Widmer and Rich argue, for instance, that Matter
of A-B- fails Chevron’s first step because its focus on the potential size of
the social group and the role of private actors as the source of persecution
are contrary to unambiguous congressional intent.92 They also argue the
decision fails Chevron’s second step “because it contravenes Congressional
intent regarding flexibility.”93
B. Judicial Review and Chevron Deference
Immigrants can challenge final removal decisions from the BIA or the
attorney general by filing a petition for review in a federal circuit court. But
there is a catch. The INA categorically bars certain cases from federal court
review.94 Judicial review is precluded for those with removal orders
stemming from certain criminal activity or the denial of relief from removal
the INA has categorized as discretionary.95 Similar to the trend in
administrative appeals to the BIA, the number of immigrants who could seek
86. Frankel, supra note 85, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
87. In re A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (Att’y Gen. 2021); Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer & Hillary Rich, A
Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, “Particular Social Group,” and Chevron, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
345, 351–53, 363 (2019) (discussing A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316).
88. Id. at 351–53, 363 (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321).
89. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316.
90. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
91. See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93 (holding “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship” can be a particular social group “dependent upon the particular facts
and evidence in a case”).
92. Kelley-Widmer & Rich, supra note 87, at 394.
93. Id. at 399.
94. INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2018).
95. Id. See generally Wadhia, supra note 50 (surveying the various ways the government uses
discretion in the immigration context).
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federal court review far exceeds the number of immigrants who actually do
seek such review.96 Again, the expense of filing a petition, access to legal
counsel, and the narrow, thirty-day window to file the petition are some of
the barriers that limit federal court review.97 Thus, any project assessing the
intra-agency effects of Chevron deference in immigration adjudication is
limited by the fact that most cases never make it to federal court. Notably,
cases involving asylum, legal questions, or constitutional claims are among
those accepted by federal courts, with federal circuit courts having exclusive
jurisdiction over removal orders.98
Just three years after deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca99 applied the Chevron deference framework to a BIA
statutory interpretation.100 Yet the Court ultimately did not defer to the
agency, finding instead that the statutory text unambiguously foreclosed the
BIA’s interpretation.101 In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia
argued that “there is simply no need and thus no justification for a discussion
of whether the interpretation is entitled to [Chevron] deference.”102 Since
Cardoza-Fonseca was decided, as Professors Hickman and Nielson
document,103 the Supreme Court has applied the Chevron deference
framework to seven BIA statutory interpretations. The agency won because
of Chevron deference in three cases.104 And the Court refused to defer in
three cases because the statute was unambiguous105 and in a fourth because
the agency asserted it had no discretion to interpret the statute differently.106
In one immigration adjudication case, a dozen years after CardozaFonseca, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[i]t is clear that principles of
96. See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 70, at 1196 (“Petitions for review of final removal orders are
rare events, and reversal of the BIA’s decisions is even rarer. Before the 2002 streamlining at the BIA,
fewer than 5% of all cases resulted in a petition for review” in a federal circuit court, “and of those, fewer
than 1 in 10 resulted in a remand.” (footnotes omitted)).
97. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: HOW TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW 5 (2015),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/how_to_file_a_
petition_for_review_2015_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6F-XS7D].
98. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
99. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
100. Id. at 446–48.
101. Id. at 448–49.
102. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, app. at 1000–13.
104. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56–58 (2014) (plurality opinion); id. at 76 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in the judgment); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012); INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–33 (1999).
105. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct.
1562, 1572 (2017); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015).
106. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514, 521 (2009).
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Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme.”107 In other
words, the Court has not treated immigration adjudication as exceptional for
the purposes of Chevron deference. Instead, it insists that the same doctrinal
framework applicable to other agency statutory interpretations applies with
equal force to BIA statutory interpretations. The story among the federal
courts of appeals is similar. In a recent study covering roughly a decade of
Chevron decisions, the circuit courts reviewed 386 BIA statutory
interpretations, upholding the BIA’s interpretation 70.2 percent of the
time.108
II. CHEVRON’S PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION
IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
The Chevron decision has been on the books for more than thirty-five
years and is cited by more than 90,000 sources on Westlaw, but its theoretical
underpinnings remain disputed and underdeveloped.109 To be sure, the
Supreme Court has grounded Chevron in congressional delegation—“a
‘presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.’”110 And this delegation theory, which the Court has suggested
though never fully developed, is grounded in the four rationales of expertise,
deliberative process, political accountability, and national uniformity of
law.111 In other words, in the Court’s view, these are the four core reasons
why Congress delegates—or at least should delegate—policymaking or lawimplementation authority to federal agencies, rather than courts. Likewise,
these rationales are also why federal agencies should receive judicial

107. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
108. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36
(2017).
109. When referencing the theory of Chevron deference, we refer to both the reasons the Supreme
Court offered for deference in the Chevron decision itself and the various theoretical justifications for the
Chevron doctrine that have since emerged in the literature and subsequent judicial decisions. See, e.g.,
Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1475–82 (2018) (providing an overview of the theory of Chevron deference and
some of its criticisms); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283–91 (2008)
(surveying rationales for Chevron deference).
110. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (quoting
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
111. See Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1475–82 (exploring these four rationales of Chevron
deference).
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deference, within the bounds of reasonableness, for how they interpret these
delegation-conferring statutory ambiguities.
This Part interrogates these four delegation values in the context of
immigration adjudication. As the Chevron Court instructed, this analysis is
necessarily comparative—that is, it involves weighing whether these values
are better realized by agencies or courts. Because the argument here is that
immigration agencies should receive Chevron deference in rulemaking but
not adjudication, the analysis must also compare these two modes of agency
action. This Part begins with, and focuses most on, the values of comparative
expertise and deliberative process, as they are particularly lacking on the
agency side in the context of immigration adjudication. This Part then turns
briefly to the other two rationales of political accountability and uniformity
in law.
A. Expertise
The predominant delegation theory that motivates Chevron deference
is the comparative expertise held by federal agencies—as compared to
courts—to fill gaps in statutes the agencies administer. Concluding that
“[j]udges are not experts in the field,” the Chevron Court distinguished the
role of judges from the expertise held by federal agencies.112 As Professor
Adam Cox explains in the immigration context, “Chevron deference is often
defended on the ground that administrative agencies have greater expertise
and more democratic accountability than courts.”113
Although the Chevron Court itself did not engage in a robust discussion
of this expertise theory, it did surmise that Congress perhaps “consciously
desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so.”114 In other words, expertise
seems to refer to comparative policy expertise, including the scientific,
technical, economic, or other subject-matter expertise relevant to filling gaps
in statutes the particular agency administers.115 As attorney Paul Chaffin puts

112. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). See generally
Sidney Shapiro & Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public Administration, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465 (2013) (conceptualizing expertise and accountability based on institutional
perspectives and the behavior of public administrations).
113. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1682
(2007). Part II.C further discusses the accountability rationale.
114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
115. See, e.g., Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron
Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 525–41 (2013) (considering
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it, “When agencies answer technical questions dealing with scientific or
economic subject matter, courts are poorly positioned to second-guess those
determinations. Judges typically do not have the extensive scientific
background possessed by appointed experts in specialty agencies.”116
Attorney Joel Cohen employs truck driving as an example: “Do we really
want judges who have never driven a truck and know nothing much about
truck driving making decisions about truck driving safety?”117 This
conception of expertise as a rationale for congressional delegation finds
empirical support from congressional drafters.118
The agency’s familiarity with the legislative process and purposes that
led to the statutory ambiguities at issue may also contribute to its expertise.
As Justice Scalia wrote, “The cases, old and new, that accept administrative
interpretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in question, their
intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue,
their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate those purposes.”119
Justice Stephen Breyer has made a similar observation, noting that “[t]he
agency that enforces the statute may have had a hand in drafting its
provisions,” “may possess an internal history in the form of documents or
‘handed-down oral tradition’ that casts light on the meaning of a difficult
phrase or provision,” and, with “its staff, in close contact with relevant
legislators and staffs, likely understands current congressional views, which,
in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior understandings.”120
In the rulemaking context, Professor Sidney Shapiro has
reconceptualized agency expertise as “craft expertise”—what he presents as

BIA expertise and its implications for Chevron deference); Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–78 (arguing
that agency expertise is not a strong rationale for Chevron deference in the immigration context).
116. Chaffin, supra note 115, at 532.
117. Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner & Jed S. Rakoff, Judges v. Bureaucrats: Who Should Defer to
Whom?, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2017, 2:12 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/two-judgesexplain-why-they-dont-buy-the-logic-of-chevron-deference.html [https://perma.cc/APC8-YQ5D].
118. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
1004, 1005 fig.11 (2013) (reporting that 93 percent of congressional drafters surveyed indicated an
agency’s area of expertise mattered as to whether Congress intends for an agency to resolve a statutory
ambiguity); accord Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999,
1053 fig.10 (2015) (reporting similar findings from agency rule drafters).
119. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 514.
120. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368
(1986) (emphasis omitted); see also Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1377, 1382–97 (2017) (documenting the role of federal agencies in the legislative process).
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the unique “institutional expertise of agencies.”121 This conception of
expertise has two related features. First, agency officials of various
backgrounds acquire through regulating certain expertise outside of their
trained disciplines, which “facilitates a richer, discursive decision-making
process in which persons trained in various disciplines interact with each
other inside and outside of the agency to debate and dispute arguments and
information put forward in the rulemaking process.”122 Second, agency
officials “develop expertise in reconciling and accounting for conflicting
evidence and arguments, disciplinary perspectives, political demands, and
legal commands.”123 “This expertise is a ‘craft’ form of expertise,” Shapiro
explains, “because it is learned more from experience than from formal
knowledge and because it is beyond the disciplinary training of individual
professionals.”124
The following Sections explore these three conceptions of agency
expertise in turn, finding that all three lack salience in the immigration
adjudication context.
1. Scientific or Technical Expertise. In many regulatory contexts, it is
quite easy to discern the scientific or technical expertise an agency can
leverage to fill the gaps in its statutory mandates. Environmental, energy,
infrastructure, financial services, and food and drug law come immediately
to mind. Yet, as Professor Hickman observes, “other areas of administrative
law where Chevron regularly applies, such as immigration . . . , do not
require scientific or other technical training.”125
Indeed, Professor Maureen Sweeney effectively contrasts the role of
technical or scientific expertise at the EPA, the agency at issue in Chevron
itself, with the lack of any such expertise required in immigration
adjudication:
The expertise required to interpret the INA, however, does not require
familiarity with technical or scientific information, nor with the workings
of an industry, nor even, for the most part, with the mechanics of

121. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure To Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem
and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015). Professor Shapiro borrows and
expands on Professor Jerry Mashaw’s observation that some of the expertise in public administration
“resides in what one might call the feel or craft of decisionmakers.” See id. at 1113 (quoting JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 67 (1983)).
122. Id. at 1099.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1599 (2006) (emphasis added).
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immigration enforcement. And though immigration decisions are
sometimes said to implicate delicate matters of foreign relations, the truth
of the matter is that it is the very unusual case that affects anyone or
anything other than the parties themselves. The vast majority of
immigration cases require expertise, not in foreign affairs, but rather in the
legal interpretation of a complex statutory and regulatory scheme. This
demands expertise in legal analysis and the application of law to facts—
precisely the sort of expertise that federal courts have.126

Sweeney extensively explores the lack of scientific or technical expertise
implicated by the statutory ambiguities the BIA resolves.127 Without
regurgitating that analysis here, the point is not that interpreting the INA
would never benefit from expertise in immigration, human rights, foreign
affairs, or related substantive fields. It just turns out, as Sweeney documents,
that the vast majority of ambiguities in the INA concern purely legal
questions, as opposed to those implicating some sort of substantive expertise.
In fact, the agency’s own hiring requirements for adjudicators reveal
the agency’s determination that such substantive experience is not required.
For example, a typical announcement for a BIA member position from 2018
describes the required experience as follows:
Applicants must have a full seven (7) years of post-bar experience as a
licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or appealing formal
hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the
Federal, State or local level. Qualifying litigation experience involves cases
in which a complaint was filed with a court, or a charging document (e.g.,
indictment or information) was issued by a court, a grand jury, or
appropriate military authority. Qualifying administrative law experience
involves cases in which a formal procedure was initiated by a governmental
administrative body.128

Job announcements for immigration judges similarly do not require any legal
or policy expertise in immigration or foreign relations, or any other scientific
or technical expertise.129 Either litigation or administrative law experience is

126. Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–75; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the
Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 806 (1997).
127. See Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–78.
128. E.g., Appellate Immigration Judge (Board Member), U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/appellate-immigration-judge-board-member
[https://perma.cc/
K5XY-ZH3S]
129. E.g., Immigration Judge, USA JOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/570894500
[https://perma.cc/ZU5H-49D7]; Immigration Judge (Elizabeth), U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-elizabeth-0 [https://perma.cc/H4WB-7ECX].
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required, but neither of those is the type of expertise that courts or scholars
have recognized as grounds for Chevron deference.130
Another way to assess if statutory interpretation via immigration
adjudication requires some sort of technical or scientific expertise is to
examine the circuit court cases in which the courts refused to apply Chevron
deference. One of us (Wadhia) represents immigrants before agency
adjudicators and federal courts and has followed a body of significant cases
in the Third Circuit, where she regularly practices. Those immigration
adjudication cases reveal the lack of expertise at the agency level.131 To
illustrate how a court’s rejection of deference plays into agency expertise,
consider the case of Da Silva v. Attorney General.132 Ludimilla Ramos Da
Silva is a native of Brazil who was admitted to the United States in 1994 and
married Aziim Leach, a U.S. citizen, in 2012.133 As the Third Circuit
recounted, Leach “subjected Da Silva to emotional, psychological, and
physical abuse throughout their marriage.”134 During one of Leach’s
numerous extramarital affairs, Da Silva twice struck Leach’s mistress in the
nose and pleaded guilty to two counts of assault.135
The INA prohibits the cancellation of removal, under the Violence
Against Women Act (“VAWA”), for an immigrant imprisoned for 180 or
more days unless the “act or conviction was connected to the alien’s having
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.”136 Despite the qualifying
criminal offense, Da Silva argued she was entitled to protection under
VAWA cancellation because her assault was “connected to” Leach’s abuse
of her.137 The Third Circuit agreed with Da Silva and took the extraordinary
step of refusing to remand to the agency.138 After all, the BIA decision in this
case was nonprecedential and thus not entitled to Chevron deference; on
130. By pointing out the absence of immigration experience in job descriptions, we do not intend to
suggest that all individuals who hold these positions lack immigration law experience or otherwise are
not qualified to serve in these roles. Indeed, many former and sitting immigration judges and BIA
members have extensive immigration expertise.
131. See, e.g., Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2016) (declining to use
Chevron deference because the BIA’s conclusion that “failure to ‘include the specific date, time, or place
of hearing’ in a NTA has no bearing on a notice recipient’s removability” conflicted with the INA’s plain
text); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603–09 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA
requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” are not entitled to Chevron deference due to
inconsistencies between the BIA requirement and past BIA decisions).
132. Da Silva v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 629 (3d Cir. 2020).
133. Id. at 631.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 632.
136. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C) (2018)).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 638.
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remand, the BIA could have reexamined the statutory question and issued a
Chevron-eligible, precedential decision.
But the Third Circuit refused to remand because it found the statutory
language “connected to” unambiguous at Chevron’s first step, leaving the
agency with no discretion.139 Relevant here, the Third Circuit also stated it
was “not convinced that the Chevron framework applies here because
interpreting ‘connected to’ does not implicate the BIA’s ‘expertise in a
meaningful way’”; this was not the first time the Third Circuit had noted the
BIA’s lack of expertise in interpreting the INA.140 Da Silva illustrates how
technical expertise in immigration law—or any other special or scientific
expertise—is not required to interpret most provisions of the INA in the
context of adjudicating immigration removal cases. In the particular case of
Da Silva, as in many others, the circuit court did not even rely on
immigration sources to determine the definition of a statutory term.
This observation is not merely anecdotal, nor is it limited to the Third
Circuit. For example, one of us (Walker) has reviewed every circuit court
decision that cites Chevron deference during an eleven-year period.141 A
main takeaway from that empirical study is that circuit courts are less
deferential to agency statutory interpretations made via immigration
adjudication than in other adjudicative contexts. In particular, the BIA’s win
rate—70.2 percent—was nearly fifteen percentage points less than the
agency win rate for statutory interpretations embraced in all other hearingbased agency adjudications in the dataset—84.7 percent.142 To be sure, it is
not just about agency win rates, but whether the circuit court refuses to apply
the Chevron deference framework at all: “[I]f the 386 immigration
adjudications were removed from the formal adjudication category, the
frequency of applying Chevron deference to formal adjudications would rise
nearly ten percentage points to 85.2% and bring the formal formats into
closer parity.”143
2. Legislative Expertise. There is another type of expertise that merits
attention—namely, the expertise derived from the principal–agent
139. Id. at 634–35.
140. Id. at 635 (quoting Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999)).
141. Barnett & Walker, supra note 108, at 27.
142. Id. at 36.
143. Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). These findings suggest that federal courts perhaps share this
skepticism about the BIA’s substantive expertise in interpreting the INA. To be sure, these findings
arguably also suggest that at least the circuit courts have already recalibrated the Chevron standard in the
immigration adjudication context. Although assessing that argument exceeds this Article’s ambitions,
courts “simply ignoring Chevron,” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J.,
dissenting), is not a viable long-term solution in the immigration adjudication context.
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relationship between Congress and the agency. As Professor Peter Strauss
explains, “The enduring and multifaceted character of the agency’s
relationship with Congress” is that the agency has comparative expertise “to
distinguish reliably those considerations that served to shape the legislation,
the legislative history wheat, from the more manipulative chaff.”144 If the
goal of statutory interpretation is to be a faithful agent of Congress, agencies
may have more expertise than courts, as they are more familiar with their
statutory schemes and the legislative process that led to the ambiguities in
those statutory mandates. As Professor Ganesh Sitaraman observes, the
agency may well “have special insight into what the goals and intentions
behind the legislation actually were, what the political and practical
compromises were, and how [the members of Congress] thought about
specific problems throughout the legislative process.”145 As one of us
(Walker) explores elsewhere, federal agencies are substantially involved in
the legislative drafting process and, indeed, play a role in drafting and
reviewing nearly every legislative action that may affect them.146
An agency, however, is a “they,” not an “it.” This specialized
knowledge of legislative purpose and process should only matter, from a
Chevron-expertise perspective, if the agency statutory interpreter possesses
that expertise—either directly because the interpreter helped draft the statute
or indirectly because the interpreter interacts with the agency personnel who
possess that expertise, such as “the relevant agency rule drafters, the policy
and legislative affairs teams, the scientists and economists where applicable,
and so forth.”147 As one of us (Walker) has explored empirically, the
interaction between relevant agency legislative experts and agency rule
drafters who interpret statutes via rulemaking is often quite strong at many
agencies, supporting the agency expertise rationale for Chevron deference in
the rulemaking context.148
With respect to agency adjudication, it is far less clear that the agency
statutory interpreters have any access to the agency’s deep expertise in the
statute’s legislative history, purposes, and processes. Most agency
adjudicators, by statute or regulation, are prohibited from engaging in ex
parte communications as part of most agencies’ strong separation of
adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions—though Professor Michael
144. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347 (1990).
145. Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 129 (2015).
146. See Walker, supra note 120, at 1382–96 (reporting findings from an empirical study of the role
of federal agencies in the legislative process).
147. Walker, supra note 118, at 1048.
148. See id. at 1034–48; Walker, supra note 120, at 1398–1405.
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Asimow observes that “[e]x parte advice to decisionmakers by nonadversarial agency staff members is customary and appropriate, so long as
it does not violate the exclusive record principle by introducing new factual
material.”149 In the immigration adjudication context, it does not appear that
the BIA consults with agency legislative experts when interpreting the INA.
It is doubtful that any such expertise-sharing activity takes place, which
severely undercuts this second type of comparative agency expertise
argument for Chevron deference.
Unlike the BIA, where sharing expertise would be difficult in light of
the agency’s current structure, the attorney general, at least in theory, should
be able to leverage that expertise if desired. After all, the attorney general is
the head of the agency and could structure the agency so as to interact with
those legislative experts when exercising final decisionmaking authority in
immigration adjudication. Yet, as far as we are aware, the attorney general
does not consult with the agency’s legislative experts when exercising
adjudicative authority. Indeed, a review of the attorney general’s referraladjudication decisions during the Trump administration reveals no express
reliance on the agency’s legislative experts when interpreting the INA.150
3. Craft Expertise. Even Professor Shapiro’s conception of “craft
expertise” seems to be lacking in the immigration adjudication context.151 To
be sure, through adjudicating hundreds of cases, BIA members become
specialists in interpreting the INA and immigration law and policy more
generally. In that sense, compared to federal judges, these agency
adjudicators may develop deeper “expertise in reconciling and accounting
for conflicting evidence and arguments, disciplinary perspectives, political
demands, and legal commands.”152
As noted in Part I.A.1, however, most of the statutory ambiguities the
BIA addresses in the INA do not implicate any technical or scientific
expertise. These are not the type of questions that involve reconciling
conflicting evidence or methodological approaches. They are generally legal
questions. Nor, as discussed in Part I.A.2, do BIA members appear to interact
with the rest of the experts at the agency. In other words, the current
organizational structure for immigration adjudication does not engender “a
richer, discursive decision-making process” where “persons trained in
149. ASIMOW, supra note 21, at 66 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 63–67 (detailing adjudicator
prohibitions on intra- and extra-agency ex parte communications).
150. See supra note 84 (citing the fourteen attorney general certification rulings issued during the
Trump administration).
151. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
152. Shapiro, supra note 121, at 1099.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

1222

3/16/2021 3:27 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:1197

various disciplines interact with each other inside and outside of the agency
to debate and dispute arguments.”153
Perhaps more importantly, the comparative analysis here is not just
between the expertise of agencies and courts. Because this Article
recommends narrowing Chevron’s immigration domain to exclude such
deference in adjudication yet preserve it for rulemaking, evaluating the
comparative expertise exercised in those two modes of agency action is
important. Due to organizational structure, the BIA is likely unable to
exercise the agency’s collective and diverse expertise when adjudicating. In
both adjudication and rulemaking, by contrast, the attorney general
theoretically has the ability to leverage the agency’s collective expertise—
whether that is technical and scientific, legislative, or craft expertise—when
interpreting statutes. So, at most, when it comes to the attorney general as
agency adjudicator, the comparative value of the agency expertise for
Chevron purposes is a wash as between adjudication and rulemaking.
In reality, and as Part II.B details, because the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process is designed to leverage agency and public expertise, one
would expect the attorney general to utilize agency expertise more in
rulemaking than adjudication. When assessing the agency’s, or court’s,
ability to leverage expertise, it is not just important whether the agency
interpreters have access to the agency’s relevant expertise. Rather, it should
matter whether the agency process is structured to leverage the agency’s
expertise and, ideally, also the experience of outside experts, stakeholders,
and the public. In other words, the deliberativeness of the process matters.
Part II.B turns to this second theory for Chevron deference.
B. Deliberative Process
The Chevron decision itself did not focus on the value of the
deliberative process in developing statutory interpretations. But subsequent
decisions have underscored this comparative value for agencies—rather than
courts—being the primary interpreters of statutes the agencies administer.154
As this Section explains, the deliberative process theory for Chevron

153. Id.
154. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013) (“[T]he preconditions to deference
under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority
to administer the Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding that not all agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities merit
Chevron deference, but “recogniz[ing] a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in
express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed”).
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deference is interrelated to the expertise theory and may just be another form
of comparative expertise. After all, agencies have flexibility to engage in a
process that incorporates all stakeholders, considers the various regulatory
alternatives, and leverages the agency’s and the public’s expertise on the
subject. Courts, by contrast, can only consider the cases before them, perhaps
with limited amicus curiae input from others who are not parties to the
litigation.
But, as Professors Hickman and Nielson underscore, most of the
comparative value agencies possess when it comes to deliberative process
lies in rulemaking, not adjudication.155 For informal rulemaking, the APA
requires that the agency provide the public with notice of the proposed rule
and an opportunity to comment.156 The proposed rule has to reflect
considered judgment through weighing regulatory alternatives, assessing the
intended and unintended consequences, and making the data supporting its
proposed rule publicly available.157 Before issuing the final rule, the agency
must also respond to material comments and may well end up adjusting the
final rule in light of those comments.158 Because the notice-and-comment
process is public, Congress, the president, the media, and other interested
groups can see what the agency is considering and raise concerns before the
agency finalizes its rule.159 This is, of course, entirely different from the
judicial process.
More importantly, notice-and-comment rulemaking is nothing like the
administrative adjudication process. As Professors Hickman and Nielson
observe, “a process that solicits comments and forces agencies to engage
with the views of the public should generally lead to better policy outcomes,”
such that the agency’s comparative expertise at least partly “comes from the
procedures that agencies are required to use.”160 In contrast, they argue,
155. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 965–68.
156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018).
157. In contrast to considered judgment,
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Portland
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the APA requires agencies
to disclose the technical data and studies on which they relied to draft the proposed rule).
158. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (“An agency must consider
and respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”).
159. See, e.g., Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 14–16 (2013).
160. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 966.
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“[a]djudications typically involve only a narrow group of parties.”161 So as a
matter of deliberative process, it is difficult to see any meaningful daylight
between the judicial and administrative adjudicative processes.
Professors Hickman and Nielson argue, moreover, that judicial
deference-imbued policymaking through agency adjudication can raise due
process concerns that rulemaking does not necessarily implicate.162 The
problem is one of unfair notice created by the retroactive application of the
policy created in the adjudication itself. To be sure, the Supreme Court held
long ago in SEC v. Chenery Corp.163 that agencies, if permitted under their
organic statutes, can choose to make policy through either adjudication or
rulemaking.164 But that does not mean Chevron deference must apply to
retroactive policies made through adjudication. Retroactivity should caution
against such deference. Rulemaking, by contrast, is usually prospective.165
And even when it is not, the agency still provides public notice of the
proposed rule and must consider public comments before the rule becomes
final—thus lessening the chance of unfair surprise to regulated parties.
In fact, in Kisor, the Court expressly reaffirmed a narrowing of Auer’s
domain in a similar fashion to exclude deference where the regulatory
interpretation lacked fair notice, such as “an interpretation that would have
imposed retroactive liability on parties for longstanding conduct that the
agency had never before addressed.”166 These due process concerns may be
even more pronounced in the immigration adjudication context, where
liberty from detention and removal is implicated. This may explain—as
Professor Michael Kagan argues—why the Supreme Court has refused to
afford Chevron deference in the immigration adjudication context when the
agency interpretations address detention or removal.167 Although beyond the
scope of this Article, there are unique harms that can flow from the
immediate and retroactive application of immigration adjudication

161. Id. at 967.
162. See id. at 971–77 (describing how adjudication can create policy that applies to past actions,
implicating the Due Process Clause).
163. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
164. Id. at 202–03.
165. Any authority to enact retroactive rules is narrowly construed:
Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language
requires this result. By the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority
will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive
rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (citation omitted).
166. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019).
167. Kagan, supra note 23, at 495.
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decisions—an application that may well precede a federal court ruling on
whether the agency has it wrong or if Chevron deference is unwarranted.
Indeed, the immigration adjudication context may even have less
deliberative and fair process than traditional APA-governed formal
adjudication or Article III judicial review. That is because immigration
adjudication, as detailed in Part I.A, does not happen before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Instead, it happens before an immigration
judge in a setting with fewer procedural protections for the immigrants than
in contexts where an ALJ presides.168 Also, the history of political hiring,
firing, and reassignment of BIA members may affect their decisional
independence. In June 2020, for example, BIA members appointed before
the Trump administration were told they would be “reassigned” to other roles
at DOJ after they rejected offers to leave the agency altogether.169 The
practice of removing BIA members with differing political views is not new,
tracing back to at least 2003 when the attorney general shrunk the BIA from
sixteen to eleven members, firing the most “liberal” members on the
Board.170 As one former BIA chair has put it, the BIA is “not a court
anymore. It’s an enforcement mechanism . . . . They’re taking predetermined
policy and just disguising it as judicial opinions, when the results have all
been predetermined and it has nothing to do or little to do with the merits of
the cases.”171 These kinds of hiring practices and the shift in adjudication
from impartiality to predetermined policy hardly encourage a deliberative
and fair process or an effective leveraging of agency expertise. Rather, they
expose the predominant role of politics in immigration adjudication. Part
II.C examines the proper role of politics in this area.

168. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 148–57 (comparing APA-governed formal
adjudication with other administrative adjudications where a hearing is required by statute or regulation).
169. Tanvi Misra, DOJ ‘Reassigned’ Career Members of Board of Immigration Appeals, ROLL CALL
(June 9, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/09/doj-reassigned-career-members-of-boardof-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/HJ53-CKVJ].
170. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked To Leave; Critics
Call It a ‘Purge,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm2003-mar-12-na-immig12-story.html [https://perma.cc/S2G5-8PKU]; see also DORSEY & WHITNEY
LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE C ASE MANAGEMENT
20–47 (2003), http://files.dorsey.com/files/Upload/DorseyStudyABA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJC5M8ZJ] (presenting findings regarding the 2002 “Procedural Reforms” at the BIA and including
information garnered from interviews with past and present agency officials and individual immigration
lawyers and groups).
171. Felipe de la Hoz, The Shadow Court Cementing Trump’s Immigration Policy, NATION (June 30,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-immigration-bia
[https://perma.cc/D28LYLG3] (reporting the comments of Paul Wickham Schmidt, who chaired the BIA between 1995 and
2001).
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Another way to gauge the deliberative process is to assess its outputs.
And the outputs in immigration adjudication do not portray a wellfunctioning process, at least when it comes to consistency across similar
cases. For example, grant rates vary widely among immigration judges.
Empirical work by Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz,
and Philip Schrag reveals that asylum cases involving similarly relevant facts
still create a “refugee roulette” depending on factors that include but are not
limited to nationality, location, and judge.172 To illustrate, they found that
in one regional asylum office, 60% of the officers decided in favor of
Chinese applicants at rates that deviated by more than 50% from that
region’s mean grant rate for Chinese applicants, with some officers
granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted
asylum in as many as 68% of their cases.173

TRAC Immigration has also produced empirical data that reveal the large
degree to which outcomes in asylum cases depend on the immigration judge
assigned to the case.174
This agency disorder has not gone unnoticed by federal judges.
Consider, for instance, Judge Richard Posner’s dissent in a case involving an
immigration judge’s denial of a continuance to allow a key witness to appear:
“Judges are not just umpires. Nor are the judicial officers of the Immigration
Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Judicial activism is deplored
but there is such a thing as excessive judicial passivity, which has been
present at all levels of adjudication of Bouras’s case.”175 When interviewed
about the logic of Chevron deference and the importance of federal courts,
Judge Posner remarked,
the performance of the immigration court and Board of Immigration
Appeals is frequently appalling, and likewise in Social Security disability
cases . . . . It would be a disaster to eliminate judicial review in immigration

172. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372–78 (2007) (using a database of judicial decisions and
cross-referencing it to publicly available biographies of judges to identify correlations).
173. Id. at 296.
174. To illustrate the disparity in outcome in the same court depending on the immigration judge
presiding in a given case, take the case of Newark immigration court: Between 2015-2020, denial rates
ranged from 20.7% to 93.1%. Immigration Judge Reports, TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/judgereports [https://perma.cc/N6FG-5CLQ].
175. Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 681 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J., dissenting); see also Cox, supra
note 113, at 1679–80 (discussing Judge Posner’s various opinions concerning the ineptitude in the BIA,
labeling the immigration courts’ decisions “arbitrary, unreasoned, irrational, inconsistent, and
uninformed” (footnotes omitted)).
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and Social Security disability cases, and I imagine likewise in the cases
decided by other federal administrative agencies.176

External factors contribute to this lack of deliberative process, and thus
the agency’s inability to leverage expertise via immigration adjudication. As
discussed in Part I.A, immigrants placed in removal proceedings have no
right to court-appointed counsel and might face an immigration judge alone.
In turn, geography greatly influences access to counsel.177 Further, the
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag study found:
[T]he chance of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the
random assignment of a case to a particular immigration judge, but also in
very large measure by the quality of an applicant’s legal representation, by
the gender of the immigration judge, and by the immigration judge’s work
experience prior to appointment.178

The ability to ensure a deliberative process is also undermined by the
sheer volume of cases in the nation’s immigration courts, which at the time
of this writing exceeds one million.179 And it is further exacerbated by the
fact that immigration judges and BIA members face pressure to meet quotas

176. Cohen et al., supra note 117.
177. See generally Eagly & Shafer, supra note 55 (presenting empirical disparities in attorney
resources along geographic lines); YOUSRA CHATTI & SARA FIRESTONE, CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RTS.
AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L., DETAINED IMMIGRANTS AND ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN
PENNSYLVANIA
(2019),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/PAFIUP%20Report%
20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5MX-CER2] (identifying how disparities in representation can be
impacted by factors such as the distance between detention facilities and city centers).
178. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 172, at 296.
179. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics: Pending Cases, New Cases,
and Total Completions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (July 14, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download [https://perma.cc/9H5A-ESPZ]; see also Sweeney,
supra note 23, at 176 (“The immigration court system suffers from serious institutional capacity
challenges that compromise its decisionmaking and limit the time and consideration it can give to any
single case . . . . [T]he history of this dysfunction is longstanding . . . .” (footnote omitted)). To be sure,
this Article does not advocate shifting these one million agency actions from adjudication to rulemaking.
The number of cases designated as BIA precedent or a decision by the attorney general for which the
Chevron framework applies is much lower. As noted in Part I.A, the attorney general issued fourteen
certification rulings during the Trump administration, see supra note 84, and the BIA has issued fewer
than one hundred precedential decisions during that same time period, see Volume 26, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/precedent-decisions-volume26 [https://perma.cc/KDS6-4SPW] (reporting two precedential BIA opinions issued after January 20,
2017); Volume 27, supra note 69 (reporting seventy-four precedential BIA opinions issued between
2017–2020); Volume 28, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-28 [https://perma.cc/4J8C-CNYU] (reporting fifteen precedential
BIA opinions issued in 2020 and January 2021). Even fewer of these roughly thirty agency adjudication
decisions per year would likely shift to rulemaking, as the agency would understandably pursue Chevronless case-by-case adjudication for some policymaking.
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and follow guidelines set by the attorney general.180 Insofar as adjudicative
decisionmaking is influenced by these factors, deliberative process and
agency expertise are undermined if not abandoned.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, by comparison, contains many of the
procedural features worthy of Chevron deference that immigration
adjudication lacks. Even if rulemaking is imperfect, the process of drafting
the rule, explaining the background, and soliciting input from the public
creates a space for a rule to be finalized with much more technical or other
expertise than what might flow from a BIA or attorney general adjudication.
After all, intra-agency coordination among various agency experts is
commonplace in the rule-drafting process,181 followed by the opportunity for
robust public input during the notice-and-comment period. Further, as one
of us (Wadhia) has argued, notice-and-comment rulemaking to establish
immigration policy at the agency level—in contrast to adjudication—
advances important values of public acceptability or buy-in, greater
consistency in outcomes, and widened transparency.182 Chevron’s political
accountability theory, which the next Section examines, further implicates
these values.
C. Political Accountability
In addition to expertise, the Chevron Court itself advanced the value of
comparative political accountability as a reason for judicial deference. As
the Chevron Court noted, “Judges are not experts in the field, and are not
part of either political branch of the Government.”183 Agencies, by contrast,
are part of a political branch, the executive, and report back to another
political branch, Congress. “Courts must, in some cases,” the Court
continued, “reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of

180. See AM. BAR ASS’N J., EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN, ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES (2018), https://
www.abajournal.com/images/main_images/03-30-2018_EOIR_-_PWP_Element_3_new.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/M68D-L55H] (outlining new quotas for immigration judges and the number of cleared cases
and decisions overturned on appeal rates to acquire a “satisfactory” rating), discussed in Lorelei Laird,
Justice Department Imposes Quotas on Immigration Judges, Provoking Independence Concerns, AM.
BAR ASS’N J. (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
justice_department_imposes_quotas_on_immigration_judges_provoking_independe [https://perma.cc/
7N3N-6P36].
181. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 118, at 1034–48 (documenting the roles of legislative history and
various agency actors in agency statutory interpretation).
182. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 26, at 152; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing
Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 27–
32, 51–55, 57–64 (2012).
183. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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the judges’ personal policy preferences.”184 A federal agency, on the other
hand, “may, within the limits of that [congressional] delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgments.”185
Under the conventional account of Chevron’s political accountability
theory, immigration adjudication might have a very strong claim to
deference. After all, as noted in Parts I.A and II.A, the attorney general has
final decisionmaking authority over decisions from immigration judges and
the BIA. And the attorney general has exercised that authority, especially in
recent years, to shape immigration policy at the agency level.186 The
conventional account seems to have force because the attorney general is
indisputably more politically accountable to the president and Congress than
an Article III federal court could ever be. And deferring to the BIA and the
attorney general would no doubt advance “the Chevron Court’s express
objective to reduce partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.”187
This conventional account, however, is incomplete on two related
grounds. First, as discussed above, the inquiry here is not just about the
comparative political accountability between agencies and courts but also
between the modes of agency action—adjudication versus rulemaking.
Policymaking through adjudication may not be an adequate substitute for
rulemaking under an “elections matter” accountability theory. Second,
political accountability should be viewed in broader terms of democratic
accountability and legitimacy. Professor Jerry Mashaw has helpfully
reframed the democratic legitimacy debate by distinguishing between two
types of accountability: aggregative or electoral accountability, and
deliberative accountability.188 He argues that American democracy melds
these two distinct visions.189 Presidential administration can easily be

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See generally Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration
Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841 (2016) (documenting
the history of the attorney general exercising powers over immigration policy); supra Parts I.A–II.A
(describing the attorney general’s role in immigration adjudication).
187. Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1524. One of us (Walker) has advocated, and continues to
believe, that Chevron’s critics “should more closely consider one significant and overlooked cost: such
reform could result in partisanship playing a larger role in judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations.” Id. It just turns out, as discussed in Part II.D, that the overall benefits of eliminating
Chevron in the immigration adjudication context outweigh these costs, especially when immigration
rulemaking would still receive Chevron deference.
188. JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 166–67
(2018).
189. Id. at 14.
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understood as advancing aggregative or electoral accountability in the
administrative state.190 Yet, he argues, the administrative state can and
should also advance deliberative accountability.191
When framed in terms of deliberative accountability, one quickly sees
how rulemaking better advances legitimacy than administrative
adjudication. Professors Hickman and Nielson nicely capture this point: “A
process that requires an agency to interact with broad segments of society
and explain why it has acted in view of concerns raised by the general public,
all else being equal, typically should yield more legitimate outcomes.”192 In
other words, Chevron’s political accountability theory “presumably also
comes from the procedures that agencies must use, in addition to the fact that
elections have consequences.”193 As Professor Frankel explores, the attorney
general’s referral and final decisionmaking process lacks the hallmarks of
public engagement and transparency that are commonplace in notice-andcomment rulemaking.194
In sum, if the choice is between rulemaking and administrative
adjudication in the immigration context, it is not a close call which mode of
agency action garners more accountability and thus legitimacy. Both modes
of agency action can advance aggregative or electoral accountability, but
rulemaking is much better at advancing deliberative accountability.
D. Uniformity in Law and the Overall Cost-Benefit Analysis
A final, more recently developed rationale for Chevron deference is that
it promotes national uniformity in federal law by limiting courts’
responsibility for determining the best reading of a statute. Professor Strauss
is arguably the moving force behind this deference theory, contending that
because courts need only assess the reasonableness of an agency’s
interpretation, it is more likely that lower federal courts across the country
will agree in accepting or rejecting the agency’s interpretation.195 In City of
Arlington v. FCC,196 the Supreme Court recognized this “stabilizing purpose
of Chevron”: unlike “[t]hirteen Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-thecircumstances test,” Chevron deference engenders predictability to agency
190. Id. at 167.
191. Id. at 167–70.
192. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 967.
193. Id.
194. See Frankel, supra note 85, at Part III.C.
195. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121–22 (1987)
[hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases].
196. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
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statutory interpretations and thus more uniformity in federal law.197 As an
empirical matter, this uniformity rationale for Chevron deference has largely
been borne out by decisions in the federal courts of appeals.198
The importance of uniformity in law may be at its apex in federal
immigration law. Uniformity is indisputably not better advanced through
judicial interpretation than agency statutory interpretation—particularly in
the modern era when the Supreme Court decides fewer than one hundred
cases per year.199 But again, the comparison is not just between courts and
agencies but between rulemaking and agency adjudication. As to the latter,
the question is a closer call. Adjudication may allow the agency to move
more swiftly to bring uniformity to federal immigration law, especially when
the circuit courts have created inter-circuit disuniformity and the agency has
a suitable case to decide the issue.200 Notice-and-comment rulemaking
generally takes more time, so perhaps administrative adjudication—at least
at the margins—better advances Chevron’s uniformity theory. This may be
particularly true in the immigration adjudication context, where the attorney
general can expeditiously exercise her referral-and-review authority to make
the final decision for the agency.201
That administrative adjudication may better advance uniformity in
federal law than judicial review or even agency rulemaking, however, should
not be overemphasized. No judge, member of Congress, or scholar likely
views national uniformity as the exclusive theory for Chevron deference.

197. Id. at 307.
198. See, e.g., Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1525 (concluding that “our findings do suggest that
Chevron creates a more favorable climate for nationwide uniformity that de novo or Skidmore review
cannot match”).
199. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 195, at 1121 (suggesting “that it is helpful to
view Chevron through the lens of the Supreme Court’s severely restricted capacity directly to enforce
uniformity upon the courts of appeals in those courts’ review of agency decisionmaking”). In the October
2019 term, the Supreme Court issued just fifty-three signed decisions—the fewest since 1862. Adam
Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019 (Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2020, 7:36 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-2019
[https://perma.cc/LN836JT2].
200. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
construction.”).
201. To be sure, the fact that policymaking via rulemaking often takes more time and resources than
policymaking via adjudication could result in immigration policy at the agency level regulating less
conduct than the INA permits. Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the
Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455, 495–97 (2020) (criticizing calls
to eliminate Chevron deference as imposing an antiregulatory asymmetry in administrative law). At least
in the immigration context, we do not view the costs of this potential underregulation to outweigh the
various important benefits of narrowing Chevron’s domain to rulemaking that Part II details.
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Instead, it is just one of at least four core rationales. And some may not even
consider uniformity to be a reason for deference at all. At the very least, the
costs and benefits of all relevant values should be weighed together. As
discussed in Part II.A and as Professors Hickman and Nielson further
elaborate, it is not a close question whether agency adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking best leverages expertise. This case study
underscores how immigration rulemaking—as opposed to adjudication—
better leverages agency and public expertise, utilizes a more deliberative
process, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, better promotes democratic
accountability and public legitimacy.
Indeed, if we were pressed to weigh just the last two values—
accountability and uniformity—agency rulemaking would come out ahead
over administrative adjudication in the immigration context. When the first
two values are considered, the case against Chevron deference in
immigration adjudication becomes so clear as to justify some course
correction to narrow Chevron’s domain. Part III turns to how to go about that
reform.
III. HOW TO NARROW CHEVRON’S IMMIGRATION DOMAIN
Part II demonstrated how Chevron’s theoretical foundation is
particularly weak in the immigration adjudication context, arguably weaker
there than in many other administrative adjudications where a hearing is
required by statute or regulation. The case to narrow Chevron’s domain in
the immigration context to just notice-and-comment rulemaking seems quite
compelling as a normative and theoretical matter. The resulting question is
how to bring about this reform. This Part focuses on three paths: the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch itself.
A. The Supreme Court and Stare Decisis
In their contribution to this Symposium, Professors Hickman and
Nielson powerfully argue that the Supreme Court should narrow Chevron’s
domain to exclude judicial deference for some, if not all, agency statutory
interpretations created via administrative adjudication.202 Assuming the
Court agrees that Chevron’s foundation is unsound in the immigration
adjudication context, stare decisis is still a potent constraint. Hickman and
Nielson argue, however, that stare decisis should not control here, for three
reasons.

202.

See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at Parts II–III.
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First, they argue that the stare decisis claim is particularly weak in the
adjudication context because the Supreme Court has seldom applied
Chevron deference to adjudication, as opposed to rulemaking. Second, the
other traditional factors—the low reliance interests, the judge-made nature
of the doctrine, and the doctrine’s incorrectness in the adjudication context—
do not support keeping the precedent. Third, various changed circumstances
in the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence—namely, that an agency
statutory interpretation can now trump a prior judicial interpretation and that
the Court has reiterated fair notice principles and retroactivity concerns in
administrative law—counsel revisiting Chevron deference in the
adjudication context.203
Fully assessing Professors Hickman and Nielson’s stare decisis
arguments exceeds this Article’s scope. But they present a compelling
case—one that seems to apply with similar force in the immigration
adjudication context. Litigants, scholars, and lower courts will surely
develop their argument further, and it merits serious attention from the
Supreme Court in an appropriate case.204 For the reasons presented in this
Article, immigration adjudication is arguably the best context within which

203. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Randy Kozel advances a different argument
for why stare decisis should pose no barrier to overruling the Chevron decision if the doctrine is based on
a theory of congressional delegation: the precedent’s “combination of exceptional breadth and intrusion
upon interpretive choice places Chevron [as currently theorized] beyond the domain of stare decisis.”
Randy J. Kozel, Retheorizing Precedent, 70 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1055 (2021).
204. Although scholars and judges may well reasonably disagree about the pull of statutory stare
decisis in this context, one of us (Walker) is not convinced that overturning this statutory precedent would
be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis. Cf. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified
Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856–63 (2018) (defending qualified
immunity for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on statutory stare decisis grounds). To be sure, as
a matter of first principles, Chevron deference is likely not a proper interpretation of § 706 of the APA,
for many of the reasons articulated by Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 985–94 (2017). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1613, 1641–57 (2019) (defending Chevron as a statutory precedent). And, Part II argued, the
normative case against Chevron in immigration adjudication is compelling. Despite these considerations,
Chevron has been the law generally since 1984 and in the immigration adjudication context specifically
since at least 1987, with the Court reaffirming the precedent numerous times. See supra Part I.B.
Importantly, moreover, there is strong evidence that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the
Chevron doctrine. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 118, at 995 (finding that the congressional
staffers surveyed “displayed a greater awareness of Chevron by name than of any other canon in our
study”). And the Court has recognized a strong presumption against administrative law exceptionalism
when interpreting the APA. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court
Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 243–50 (2014) (arguing that the APA sets the default standards
for judicial review of agency action when an agency’s organic statute does not provide its own standard
of review); cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 583, 584–92 (2017) (detailing how immigration law is already exceptional at the constitutional
law level).
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courts and litigants can build the case for narrowing Chevron’s domain in
the adjudication context.
B. Congress and Comprehensive Immigration Reform
The Supreme Court, of course, is not the only actor with the power to
narrow Chevron’s domain. The Court has emphasized that “[a]ll our
interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, effectively become part of
the statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to congressional change.”205
As noted in the Introduction, Republicans in recent years have proposed
legislation to amend the APA to eliminate Chevron deference entirely.206 We
highly doubt such sweeping legislative proposals will garner the requisite
bipartisan support any time soon. And we are not convinced that eliminating
Chevron deference for all agency statutory interpretations would make for
good policy.
But what Congress should do is surgically remove Chevron deference
for agency statutory interpretations made in immigration adjudications yet
preserve it for immigration interpretations promulgated via notice-andcomment rulemaking. For the former category of agency action, Congress
should not command de novo review but instead replace Chevron with the
less deferential Skidmore standard, which instructs courts to give weight to
administrative interpretations of law based on the “thoroughness evident in
[the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”207 This shift from Chevron
to Skidmore, as Professor Strauss explains, is an important move from a
binding policymaking “space” where the agency’s reasoning does not matter
as much, to a nonbinding “weight” where the agency’s position prevails to
the extent it reflects special expertise.208
This legislative change, moreover, would not be made to the APA
“superstatute” that governs the entire regulatory state.209 Instead, Congress
should amend the judicial review provisions of the INA. A provision that
narrows Chevron’s domain to just rulemaking under the INA could be a
minor detail as part of a larger immigration reform bill. And it should garner

205. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).
206. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
207. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
208. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012).
209. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J.
1207, 1209 (2015).
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at least some bipartisan support—from Republicans who have long called
for the elimination of Chevron generally and from Democrats and
Republicans who appreciate the normative case against Chevron deference
in immigration adjudication in particular.
Such legislative reform would not be unprecedented. As Professor
Barnett details, Congress similarly “codified Chevmore” when it enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.210
There, Congress targeted the judicial deference the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (“OCC”) receives for its decisions that federal law preempts
state consumer financial laws. For OCC interpretations preempting state law,
Congress replaced Chevron with Skidmore.211 And it included a savings
clause to make clear that the OCC should continue to receive Chevron
deference for all other statutory interpretations.212 Congress could similarly
codify Chevmore in the immigration adjudication context by, for instance,
amending the INA’s standard-of-review provisions for removal orders.213
As Professor Barnett explores in greater detail, through Chevmore
codification “Congress can provide a ‘Chevron reward’ or a ‘Skidmore
penalty’ in light of agency behavior.”214 By shifting to the less deferential
Skidmore standard for immigration adjudication, the BIA and attorney
general will face greater incentives to exercise expertise, engage in reasoned
decisionmaking, and perhaps “play it safer” when interpreting the INA via
adjudication.215 After all, Skidmore focuses judicial review on the agency’s
exercise of expertise and reasoned decisionmaking.216 Failure to do so would
risk judicial invalidation of the agency’s statutory interpretation. To provide
one empirical snapshot, a study of all circuit court decisions citing Chevron
during an eleven-year period showed agency interpretations were
significantly more likely to prevail under Chevron (77.4 percent) than
Skidmore (56.0 percent).217

210. Barnett, supra note 28, at 10, 22–33.
211. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2018) (instructing the reviewing court to “assess the validity of
[the OCC Comptroller’s] determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration
of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, [and] the consistency with other valid
determinations made by the agency”).
212. Id. § 25b(b)(5)(B).
213. See INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2018) (detailing the scope and standard of review
for judicial review of removal orders).
214. Barnett, supra note 28, at 51.
215. Cf. Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1384 (2013) (“The chance of
receiving more stringent review gives agencies an incentive to ‘play it safer’ when interpreting statutes
than they otherwise might.”).
216. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
217. Barnett & Walker, supra note 108, at 30 fig.1.
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Because an agency is more likely to prevail in court under Chevron than
Skidmore, DOJ will also face incentives to move major policymaking out of
adjudication and into notice-and-comment rulemaking, where the agency
would still receive the Chevron reward. Not only does this channel
immigration policymaking at the agency level to the more publicly
transparent and accountable rulemaking process, but it also encourages
Congress to play a larger role in the development of immigration law and
policy. As Professor Barnett astutely concludes, “Chevmore codification,
like appropriations, congressional oversight, sunset provisions, and
confirmation for agency officers, becomes another tool for congressional
oversight of agency action.”218
C. The Executive Branch and Internal Administrative Law
Narrowing Chevron’s domain in the immigration context does not
require judicial or congressional action. The Executive Branch can do it
unilaterally. The Supreme Court famously held in Chenery in 1947 that “the
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the
administrative agency.”219 To be sure, there may be in certain circumstances
“a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory
standards.”220 The Chenery Court identified three: (1) “problems may arise
in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee,
problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general
rule”; (2) “the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard
and fast rule”; or (3) “the problem may be so specialized and varying in
nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general
rule.”221
As Part II.A highlights, these circumstances will likely not present
themselves often in the immigration context. And when they do, the BIA and
attorney general should not categorically avoid utilizing adjudication to
engage in “case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.”222 Instead, the
218. Barnett, supra note 28, at 56.
219. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (“Even apart from the Administrative Procedure
Act this Court has for more than four decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was
basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility
for substantive judgments.”).
220. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
221. Id. at 202–03.
222. See id.
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argument here is that the Executive Branch—through the attorney general
and DHS secretary—should shift the default to rulemaking for immigration
policymaking.223 And when it is necessary to engage in adjudicative
policymaking, the attorney general should not seek Chevron deference for
those statutory interpretations but instead should ask the court to review the
agency’s interpretation under the less deferential Skidmore standard—or
perhaps seek no deference at all.
To be sure, whether an agency can waive Chevron deference is hotly
contested, with Justices Breyer and Gorsuch both suggesting last year that
Chevron is waivable.224 Even if a court will not honor Chevron waiver, an
agency can still choose to adjudicate with the assumption that Chevron does
not apply. There is some, albeit limited, empirical support for the commonsense intuition that agencies are less aggressive or more faithful to their
statutory mandates if they believe their statutory interpretations will not
receive Chevron deference.225 And, as one of us (Walker) has counseled
elsewhere, when waiving Chevron deference, the agency “should not hold
back on its Skidmore analysis” but “utilize its ‘full panoply of Skidmore
reasoning.’”226 In other words, the agency should not only waive Chevron

223. Currently, the attorney general and the DHS secretary hold immigration policymaking authority.
See INA § 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall establish such
regulations, . . . review such administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such
authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying
out this section.”); INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (charging the DHS Secretary “with the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and
naturalization of aliens,” but providing “[t]hat determination and ruling by the Attorney General with
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling”).
224. See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (writing for the majority,
Justice Breyer noted that “[n]either the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to give what the
Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute”); Guedes v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., statement regarding
the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit was “mistaken” to hold that Chevron is not waivable
and observing that “[t]his Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government
fails to invoke it”); see also, e.g., James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 183, 184 (2019) (arguing against waiver); Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving
Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927, 1930 (2018) (same); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 1520 (2019) (same). See generally Kristin E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron,
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 405 (2020) (summarizing the current debate in the federal courts on Chevron deference
waiver).
225. See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 722–24, 722 fig.3 (2014) (reporting that two in five rule drafters surveyed agreed
or strongly agreed—with another two in five somewhat agreeing—that a federal agency is more
“aggressive” in its interpretive efforts if it is confident Chevron deference applies, as opposed to the less
deferential Skidmore standard or de novo review).
226. Christopher J. Walker, How To Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73, 80 (2013)
(quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
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deference; it should adjudicate in a way that would be more likely to
withstand judicial scrutiny under Skidmore.
The Executive Branch should go further than just reforming how it
makes policy via immigration adjudication. It should commit to shifting
major immigration policymaking away from adjudication and into the realm
of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The agency can commit to this new
process, without a congressional or judicial command, via its discretion to
create internal administrative law.227 Indeed, DOJ recently codified a similar
procedural-channeling and deference-limiting internal law in the context of
agency guidance and Auer deference to agency regulatory interpretations. In
an interim final rule promulgated in August 2020, DOJ set forth a number of
rules and procedures for creating agency guidance documents and instructed
that “[t]he Department shall not seek deference [in litigation] to any guidance
document issued by the Department or any component after the effective
date of this rule that does not substantially comply with the[se]
requirements.”228
At the same time, the president and Congress need not stand by, waiting
for this internal administrative law to develop organically. The president
should insist on this internal reform of anyone nominated to serve as attorney
general, and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee can and should
extract this commitment from the nominee as part of the confirmation
process.229 An early commitment by the attorney general to shift major
immigration policy to informal rulemaking will encourage a shift internally.
Moreover, legislating Chevmore for immigration adjudication would create
additional “Chevron rewards” to incentivize the Executive Branch to make
major immigration policy through rulemaking.

Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1143 n.179
(2008)).
227. Internal administrative law broadly includes all “measures governing agency functioning that
are created within the agency or the executive branch and that speak primarily to government personnel,”
Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1251
(2017), all of which “share the fundamental characteristic of being implemented from inside of agencies
to control their actions and operations,” Christopher J. Walker & Rebecca Turnbull, Operationalizing
Internal Administrative Law, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1225, 1231 (2020).
228. Processes and Procedures for Issuance and Use of Guidance Documents, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,200,
63,202 (Oct. 7, 2020) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 50).
229. The president demanding this change in internal administrative law is consistent with Professor
Ming Hsu Chen’s call that the president should be the administrator-in-chief. See Ming H. Chen,
Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV.
347, 351 (2017) (“The normative theory of the Administrator-in-Chief is that the President is most
justified when bolstering administrative procedure, with the effect of enhancing perceptions of legitimacy
by the agency officials who implement them, and increasing their policy effectiveness.”).
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As Professors Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack observe, “[t]he
constraints imposed by internal administrative law will be critical in resisting
unlawful or excessive assertions of administrative power now, just as they
have been in the past.”230 Shifting from adjudication to rulemaking for
immigration policymaking at the agency level is just one more example of
the virtues of internal administrative law.231
CONCLUSION
When then-Judge Gorsuch remarked that Chevron deference is the
“elephant in the room,”232 many suspected that Gorsuch was joining the call
to eliminate Chevron deference entirely. That was certainly the mood, at
least from the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee at Gorsuch’s
confirmation hearing. But a closer look at the immigration context in which
Gorsuch expressed those concerns reveals that the theoretical foundations
for Chevron deference are perhaps most precarious with respect to
immigration adjudication. And narrowing Chevron’s immigration domain to
just rulemaking would not have the “titanic real-world implications on all
aspects of our everyday lives” that the senators worried about at Gorsuch’s
confirmation.233 To the contrary, shifting the default from adjudication to
rulemaking to establish federal immigration policy would be more consistent
with Chevron’s theoretical foundations—to leverage agency expertise, to
engage in a deliberative process, and to increase political accountability.
In the lead article in this Symposium, Professors Hickman and Nielson
call on the Supreme Court to reconsider Chevron’s domain when it comes to

230. Metzger & Stack, supra note 227, at 1248.
231. This shift to rulemaking in the immigration context should not be interpreted as granting a blank
check to the agency. Chevron deference still requires a court to find the statute “genuinely ambiguous”
and the agency’s interpretation “reasonable”—inquiries the Court has emphasized are exacting. Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–16 (2019). Moreover, the rulemaking must withstand arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA, which the Court in recent years has suggested is a much “harder look”
than those APA terms may suggest. Christopher J. Walker, What the Census Case Means for
Administrative Law: Harder Look Review?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 27, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-census-case-means-for-administrative-law-harder-look-review
[https://perma.cc/ZX9U-7C67]; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1913–16 (2020) (holding that the APA requires the agency to consider regulatory alternatives
and reliance interests); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (holding that per
the APA’s “reasoned explanation requirement,” an agency must “offer genuine justifications for
important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public”); Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983) (articulating the APA’s reasoned
decisionmaking requirement).
232. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
233. Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); see supra
notes 4–8 and accompanying text.
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administrative adjudication. Such judicial attention is merited, especially
with respect to immigration adjudication where the lack of agency expertise
and deliberative process is glaring. But it is a mistake to focus only on courts
when it comes to immigration law and policy. The political branches can and
should act. Comprehensive immigration reform should be a legislative
priority, and Chevmore codification in the INA should garner bipartisan
support as part of any such proposal. But the Executive Branch need not wait
for Congress. The attorney general, under the president’s direction if
necessary, can and should embrace this reform internally—by waiving
Chevron deference in immigration adjudication and by turning to rulemaking
instead of adjudication to make major changes to immigration law and policy
at the agency level.

